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DUTIES IN CONFLICT: MUST PSYCHOTHERAPISTS
REPORT CHILD ABUSE INFLICTED BY CLIENTS
AND CONFIDED IN THERAPY?
This Comment will investigate whether confidential communica-
tions between psychotherapist and client regarding child abuse
must be divulged, or whether these communications are protected
by either the constitutionally based right to privacy or the statu-
tory psychotherapist-client privilege. Also examined in this Com-
ment are the civil and criminal liabilities that may be imposed on
a therapist for unreported incidents of child abuse. Finally, as-
suming that therapists must report child abuse inflicted by clients,
this Comment will explore the effect that this compromise of con-
fidentiality may have on the therapeutic process.
INTRODUCTION
Child abuse is a long-standing problem. The concept that children
are property of their parents is traceable to the earliest days of re-
corded history.' As a result of this presupposition, children have suf-
fered violence, neglect, abandonment, slavery and murder.2 With the
arrival of the twentieth century, however, attitudes changed regard-
ing the rights of children to be protected from such abuse.' By the
end of the 1930's, a variety of private and public child welfare agen-
cies existed in most states. Despite the creation of these agencies,
few incidents of child abuse or neglect were reported to the authori-
ties. Not until 1962, when physician C.H. Kempe published a study
which documented physical injuries to children and coined the term
"battered child syndrome,"' did public concern become widespread.
1. Schwartz, Hirsch, Child Abuse and Neglect: A Survey of the Law, 28 MED.
TR. TECH. Q. 293 (1982).
2. Id. at 293.
3. Besharov, Child Protection: Past Progress, Present Problems and Future Di-
rections, 17 FAm. L.Q. 151, 152 (1983).
4. Id. at 152.
5. Id. at 153.
6. Kempe, Silverman, Droegmueller & Silver, The Battered Child Syndrome,
181 J.A.M.A. 17 (1962). The syndrome should be considered in any child exhibiting evi-
dence of possible trauma or neglect (fracture of any bone, subdural hematoma, multiple
soft tissue injuries, poor skin hygiene, or malnutrition) or where there is a marked dis-
crepancy between the clinical findings and the historical data as supplied by the parents.
Id. at 24.
7. Besharov, supra note 3, at 153.
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Within four years of Kempe's study, all fifty states enacted legisla-
tion requiring physicians to report physical abuse of children.8 Sub-
sequently, legislatures expanded these reporting statutes to include
other professionals as it became clear that physicians were not the
only ones to come into contact with child abuse and that the identifi-
cation of abuse victims was an essential step in protecting children.'
In 1963 California enacted a reporting statute requiring certain
professionals and non-professionals to report to a designated author-
ity observations of any minor with physical injuries that appeared
intentionally inflicted.10 Between 1963 and 1980 the statute was
amended at regular intervals to require additional persons to report
such injuries."1 In 1981, the original statute was repealed arid re-
placed by new legislation12 that specifically identified those persons
who "shall" and who "may" report child abuse.13 Individuals re-
quired to report include child care custodians, medical practitioners,
non-medical practitioners, and employees of a child abuse agency. 4
The statute defines each of these four categories. Psychiatrists and
psychologists are included in the definition of "medical practi-
tioner."15 These two professional groups, psychiatrists and psycholo-
gists (herein collectively referred to as "psychotherapists"), provide
the focus of this Comment.16
8. Besharov, supra note 3, at 159.
9. Note, Civil Liability for Teachers' Negligent Failure to Report Suspected
Child Abuse, 28 WAYNE L. REv. 183, 184 (1981).
10. CAL. PENAL CODE § 11161.5 (repealed 1980).
11. Amendments: 1965 added dentist, resident, intern or religious practitioners;
1966 added school superintendents and principals; 1968 added registered nurses; 1971
added teachers, licensed day care workers and social workers; 1972 added podiatrists and
administrators of public or private summer day camps or child care centers; 1977 added
marriage counselors, child counselors, and psychologists. See CAL. PENAL CODE §
11161.5 (repealed 1980).
12. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 11161.5 (West 1982). Section 5 of Stats. 1980 c. 1071
provided: "In reenacting the child abuse reporting law, it is the intent of the Legislature
to-clarify the duties and responsibilities of those who are required to report child abuse."
Historical notes accompanying CAL. PENAL CODE § 11165 (West 1982).
13. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 11166a, 11166(b), 11166(c) (West 1982).
14. CAL. PENAL CODE § 11166(a) (West 1982).
15. "Medical practitioner" means a physician and surgeon, psychiatrist, psycholo-
gist, dentist, resident, intern, podiatrist, chiropractor, licensed nurse, dental hygienist, or
any other person who is currently licensed under Division 2 (commencing with Section
500) of the Bus. & Prof. Code. CAL. PENAL CODE § 11165(i) (West 1982).
16. As used in this Comment, "psychotherapist" means:
(a) A person authorized or reasonably believed by the patient to be authorized,
to practice medicine in any state or nation who devotes, or is reasonably believed
by the patient to devote, a substantial portion of his time to the practice of
psychiatry; or
(b) a person certified as a psychologist under Chapter 6.6 (commencing with
Section 2900) of Division 2 of the Bus. & Prof. Code. (Stats. 1965, c. 299, §
1010).
CAL. EvID. CODE § 1010 (West 1966). "Psychotherapist" and "therapist" will be used
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The new California legislation also changed the conditions upon
which a report is required. Previously, individuals were required to
report the appearance of non-accidental injuries that they directly
observed on a minor.17 Under the current statute, it is no longer nec-
essary that the injuries be actually observed.' 8 Psychotherapists must
now report child abuse when they have facts that could cause a
reasonable person in their position, with their training and experi-
ence, to suspect child abuse.' 9
It is clear that the reporting statute requires psychotherapists to
report child abuse when a child with whom they have contact shows
evidence of abuse. It is less certain that the statute requires psycho-
therapists to report when they know or reasonably suspect that their
clients are abusing children.
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO PRIVACY AND COMPELLING STATE
INTEREST
Communications between a psychotherapist and client are pro-
tected by both the constitutionally based right to privacy and by the
California psychotherapist-client privilege. Arguably, these protec-
tions extend to communications about child abuse, thus creating an
apparent conflict with the reporting statute.
Right to Privacy
At least one commentator has argued that requiring psychothera-
pists to report child abuse discovered during therapy conflicts with
the constitutional right to privacy of the patient and perhaps also,
the privacy right of the psychotherapist." This right generally limits
unwarranted governmental intrusion into fundamentally important
interchangeably in this Comment.
17. CAL. PENAL CODE § 11161.5(a) (Deering 1980).
18. CAL. PENAL CODE § 11166(a) (West 1982).
19. [A]ny child care custodian, medical practitioner, nonmedical practitioner,
or employee of a child protective agency who has knowledge of or observes a
child in his or her professional capacity or within the scope of his or her employ-
ment whom he or she knows or reasonably suspects has been the victim of child
abuse shall report the known or suspected instance of child-abuse to a child
protective agency immediately or as soon as practically possible by telephone
and shall prepare and send a written report thereof within 36 hours of receiving
the information concerning the incident.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 11166(a) (West 1982).
20. Smith, Constitutional Privacy in Psychotherapy, 49 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 1,
59 (1980).
aspects of an individual's life.21 In 1965 the Supreme Court recog-
nized a specific constitutional right to privacy in Griswold v. Con-
necticut.22 In Griswold, the Court struck down a Connecticut statute
prohibiting married couples from using contraceptive devices. Al-
though the Court found that privacy is a constitutional right in this
context, the Court did not tie this right to a specific constitutional
provision. Rather, the Court referred to the penumbras of the Bill of
Rights,23 emphasizing the ninth24 and the fourteenth amendments. 25
In 1973, however, the Court in Roe v. Wade26 cited the fourteenth
amendment's concept of personal liberty and its restriction upon
state action as the contextual basis for the right to privacy. The
Court arrived at this conclusion after reviewing previous decisions
leading to the establishment of this right.27
Although the constitutional right to privacy has been recognized,
its scope is seriously debated. 28 The Court in both Griswold and Roe
held that the right to be free from governmental interference is lim-
ited when a compelling state interest exists.29 In Roe the Court
stated that, "Where certain 'fundamental rights' are involved, ...
regulation limiting these rights may be justified only by a 'compel-
ling state interest' and that legislative enactment must be narrowly
drawn to express only the legitimate state interest at stake. 3 0
Compelling State Interest
Laws against child abuse and neglect reflect a recognition that so-
ciety has a compelling interest in stopping child abuse. Child abuse
can result in death or in long-term disabilities such as mental retar-
dation, loss of hearing or sight, lack of motor control, speech defects,
growth failure and autistic behavior.31 Although child abuse does not
always result in death or permanent injury, the emotional effects are
longstanding. Aggression, destructiveness, fear, withdrawal, poor so-
cial relations,32 and emotional problems33 are associated with child
21. Id. at I.
22. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
23. Id. at 484, 485, 496.
24. Id. at 491, 484, 496.
25. Id. at 500, 502.
26. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). This decision struck down criminal laws which prohib-
ited abortions except when they were necessary to save the life of the mother and based
this decision on the mother's right to privacy. Id. at 164.
27. Id. at 153.
28. Smith, supra note 20, at 19.
29. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 495-98 (1965).
30. 410 U.S. 113, 155-56 (1973).
31. M. ESKIN & M. KROVITE, CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT 25 (1980).
32. J. CHRISTIANSEN, EDUCATIONAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL PROBLEMS OF ABUSED
CHILDREN 58, 59 (1980).
33. Id. at 27. See also C. SMITH, D. BERKMAN, & W. FRASER, A PRELIMINARY
NATIONAL ASSESSMENT OF CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT AND THE JUVENILE JUSTICE
[VOL. 22: 645. 19851 Duties in Conflict
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
abuse. Victims of sexual abuse experience guilt, anxiety, low self-
esteem, hostile/aggressive 34 and delinquent behavior.35 Moreover,
academic achievement for most sexually or physically abused chil-
dren is below grade level. 36
Beyond relieving the injury and pain experienced by the individual
child, an even stronger state interest in preventing child abuse lies in
the recursive nature of the crime. Today's abused child becomes to-
morrow's child abuser. Two researchers, Steele and Pallock,37 found
that all the participants in their study group of abusing parents were
rearing their children in the same style in which they themselves
were reared.38 These authors report clinical observations of abusive
child-rearing styles extending through three successive generations.3 9
Although a compelling state interest in preventing child abuse is
obvious, not all authors agree that this interest is furthered by in-
fringing the patient's right to privacy in psychotherapy. Smith ar-
gues that the state's interest in preventing a child abuse is not signif-
icantly promoted by laws requiring therapists to report all incidents
of child abuse discovered in therapy.40 He believes such a threat to
confidentiality might keep some abusers from seeking therapy or
cause them to withhold information about child abuse from their
therapist. Smith writes: "By requiring therapists to breach the confi-
dences of patients, the state would be discouraging child abusers
from seeking effective psychotherapy to deal with the problems that
cause them to abuse their children." 4 1
SYSTEM: THE SHADOWS OF DISTRESS (1980). "[Elvidence points in the direction that
there is a significant link between abuse, neglect, and juvenile delinquency." Id. at 138.
Shelters for runaways report that a high percentage of their clients have been abused or
neglected. Id. at 35.
34. V. DEFRANCIS, PROTECTING THE CHILD VICTIMS OF SEX CRIMES COMMITTED
BY ADULTS, 159-62 (1969).
35. Id. at 162. See also NATIONAL CENTER IN CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT,
CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE: INCEST, ASSAULT, AND SEXUAL EXPLOITATION (1978). Reports
suggest that many children and adolescents sexually exploited for prostitution or produc-
tion of pornographic materials were victims of incest or are runaways trying to escape a
sexually exploitative situation at home. Id. at 19.
36. J. CHRISTIANSON, supra note 32, at 72, 73. See also V.-DEFRANCIS Protecting
the Child Victims of Sex Crimes Committed by Adults. High rates of school absentee-
ism and school dropout are noted among the sexually abused. Id. at 163.
37. Steele & Pallock, A Psychiatric Study of Parents Who Abuse Infants and
Small Children, in THE BATTERED CHILD (Helfer and Kempe 2d ed. 1972).
38. Id. at 97.
39. Id. at 98.
40. Smith, Constitutional Privacy in Psychotherapy, 49 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 1
(1980).
41. Id. at 59.
Other scholars, however, assert that reporting the abuse inflicted
by clients can have a beneficial effect on therapy.4 2 In addition to
helping the client, reporting such abuse ensures that the child will be
protected while the abuser is receiving therapy. Although a therapist
may assist a client in changing abusive behavior, the therapist can
offer no protection for the child in the interim. Reporting the child
abuse immediately furthers the state interest in protecting the child.
This state interest is sufficiently compelling to justify a statute re-
quiring psychotherapists to report child abuse even when they learn
of the abuse through confidential communications in therapy.
THE PSYCHOTHERAPIST-CLIENT PRIVILEGE AND THE DANGEROUS
PATIENT EXCEPTION
Even though a compelling state interest may justify requiring psy-
chotherapists to report when clients are abusing children, the report-
ing statute may conflict with the psychotherapist-client privilege. 3
Psychotherapist-Client Privilege in California
In 1965 the California legislature enacted the psychotherapist-cli-
ent privilege after carefully weighing several factors involved in pro-
tecting such a relationship. The Senate Committee on the Judiciary
noted that successful psychoanalysis and psychotherapy depend upon
the fullest revelation of the most intimate and embarrassing details
of the patient's life, and that the interest of society are served in
assuring patients that their confidences are protected."
42. Summit, Sexual Child Abuse, the Psychotherapist and the Team Concept, in
DEALING WITH SEXUAL CHILD ABUSE 22 (1982).
43. Subject to Section 912 and except as otherwise provided in this article,
the patient, whether or not a party, has a privilege to refuse to disclose, and to
prevent another from disclosing, a confidential communication between patient
and psychotherapist if the privilege is claimed by:
(a) the holder of the privilege;
(b) a person who is authorized to claim the privilege by the holder of the privi-
lege; or
(c) the person who was the psychotherapist at the time of the confidential com-
munication, but such person may not claim the privilege if there is no holder of
the privilege in existence or if he is otherwise instructed by a person authorized
to permit disclosure. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1014 (West 1966).
44. The legislative intent was further clarified in a later portion of the comment:
The law revision commission has received several reliable reports that persons in
need of treatment sometimes refuse such treatment from psychiatrists because
the confidentiality of their communications cannot be assured under existing
law. Many of these persons are seriously disturbed and constitute threats to
other persons in the community. Accordingly, this article established a new priv-
ilege that grants to patients of psychiatrists a privilege much broader in scope
than the ordinary physician-patient privilege. Although it is recognized that the
granting of the privilege may operate in particular cases to withhold relevant
information, the interests of society are better served if psychiatrists are able to
assure patients that their confidences will be protected.
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The California judiciary approved of the psychotherapist-client
privilege and recognized its constitutional basis in the case of In Re
Lifschutz."1 Lifschutz involved a psychiatrist's petition for a writ of
habeas corpus. He had been imprisoned on grounds of contempt for
refusing to obey a trial court order that he answer deposition ques-
tions and produce records involving communications with a former
client.4 6 In addressing the. issue of confidentiality in psychotherapy,
the supreme court stated, "We believe that a patient's interest in
keeping such confidential revelations from a public purview, in re-
taining this substantial privacy, has deeper roots than the California
statute and draws sustenance from our constitutional heritage. '47
The supreme court, however, affirmed the trial court's ruling that
the psychotherapist-client privilege was not applicable in the Lif-
schutz case because the former patient had made his mental and
emotional stress an issue in his legal action against an alleged assail-
ant.48 According to the trial court, this activated the patient-litigant
exception49 to the psychotherapist-client privilege.50 The supreme
court noted that the psychotherapist-client privilege was not abso-
lute,51 even though it rested on constitutional underpinnings. Hence,
state interference with such a confidentiality is sometimes permit-
ted.52 The enumerated exceptions to the psychotherapist-client privi-
lege reflect the intent of the legislature to limit this privilege in cer-
tain situations.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 1014 (Senate Committee Comment) (West 1966).
45. 2 Cal. 3d 415, 85 Cal. Rptr. 829 (1970).
46. Id. at 415, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 829.
47. Id. at 431, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 839.
48. Id. at 436, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 843.
49. There is no privilege under this article as to a communication relevant to an
issue concerning the mental or emotional condition of the patient if such issue has been
tendered by:
(a) the patient;
(b) any party claiming through or under the patient;
(c) any party claiming as a beneficiary of the patient through a contract to
which the patient is or was a party; or
(d) the plaintiff in an action brought under Section 376 or 377 of the Code of
Civil Procedure for damages for the injury or death of the patient.
CAL. EVID. CODE § 1016 (West 1966).
50. 2 Cal. 3d at 421, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 831.
51. "We do not believe the patient-psychotherapist privilege should be frozen
into the rigidity of absolutism." Id. at 438.
52. Id. at 432, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 840.
Dangerous Patient Exception to the Psychotherapist-Client
Privilege
In Lifschutz, the supreme court recognized that a statutory excep-
tion to the psychotherapist-client privilege can render the privilege
inapplicable. Just as the patient-litigant exception was held to apply
in Lifschutz, the dangerous patient exception53 may apply when a
client confides to his or her therapist that he or she is currently abus-
ing a child. No privilege exists when a psychotherapist has reasona-
ble cause to believe that his or her patient is "dangerous"" to him-
self or to the person or property of another and when the disclosure
of the communication is necessary to prevent the threatened dan-
ger.55 Arguably, a client who is abusing children is "dangerous to
others," and the therapist may therefore be required to disclose the
pertinent therapy communications to the authorities. Circumstances
such as these may activate the dangerous-patient exception and nul-
lify the psychotherapist-client privilege.
Applying the dangerous patient exception when a client admits
having abused children in the past is more complicated. In some sit-
uations, for example, the client may no longer be dangerous, render-
ing the exception inapplicable. However, research indicates that
child abuse is frequently linked to a certain style of child rearing and
is generally repetitive in nature.5 In some cases, therefore, it may be
reasonable for the therapist to conclude that the child abuse is ongo-
ing even though the client speaks of it as a past occurrence. The
dangerous-patient exception might therefore apply when a client
communicates only that he or she has previously abused children.
The Pschotherapist-Client Privilege in Criminal Proceedings
As noted above, the psychotherapist-client privilege does not apply
when the client is dangerous, or when the state has a compelling
interest in obtaining the confidential information revealed by the cli-
ent. The privilege does apply, however, in criminal proceedings
53. There is no privilege under this article if the psychotherapist has reasonable
cause to believe that the patient is in such a mental or emotional condition as to be
dangerous to himself or to persons or property of another, and that disclosure of the
communication is necessary to prevent the threatened danger. CAL. EvID. CODE § 1024
(West 1966).
54. See generally Note, The Scope of a Psychiatrist's Duty to Third Persons:
The Protective Privilege Ends Where the Public Peril Begins, 59 NOTE DAME L. R. 770-
78 (1984) (analysis of the difficulty in determining "dangerousness" of a patient). See
also Tarasoff v. Regents of University of California 17 Cal. 3d 425, 437-38, 451-52; 131
Cal. Rptr. 14, 24-25, 33-34 (1976) (regarding predictability of "dangerousness"),
55. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1024 (West 1966).
56. McCord, The Battered Child and Other Assaults Upon the Family, 50
MINN. L. REV. 1, 8, 18 (1965).
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against the client5 unless the client makes his or her mental or emo-
tional condition an issue in the proceeding.58 The comment of the
Senate Committee on the Judiciary indicates that the legislature in-
tended that the privilege apply in criminal proceedings so that a pa-
tient may talk freely to a psychotherapist without fear that the latter
will be compelled in such a proceeding to reveal what he or she has
been told.59 If a psychotherapist reports child abuse to the authori-
ties and the abuse is of such a nature as to lead to the prosecution of
the abuser, the psychotherapist-client privilege would appear to pro-
tect communications between the therapist and the client from being
divulged in a criminal proceeding.60
Additionally, the privilege may even protect the identity of the
abuser. The child abuse reporting statute requires the psychothera-
pist to give the name of the child to the authorities, but not the name
of the abuser.6' Consequently, the psychotherapist-client privilege
and the reporting statute might interact negatively in certain situa-
tions. For example, a patient might confide that he or she is cur-
rently abusing neighborhood children. If the therapist reports as
mandated, the patient may stop therapy, perceiving a violation of
trust, and continue to abuse children. The privilege would prevent
the therapist from assisting the police in the ensuing criminal
investigation.
Similar dilemmas have recently plagued the clergy. In September,
57. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1014 (West 1965).
58. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
59. The psychotherapist-patient privilege applies in all proceedings. The phy-
sician-patient privilege does not apply in criminal proceedings. This difference in
the scope of the two privileges is based on the fact that the Law Revision Com-
mission has been advised that proper psychotherapy often is denied a patient
solely because he will not talk freely to a psychotherapist for fear that the latter
may be compelled in a criminal proceeding to reveal what he has been told. The
commission has also been advised that research in this field will be unduly ham-
pered unless the privilege is available in criminal proceedings.
Senate Committee on Judiciary Comment CAL. EVID. CODE § 1014 (West 1980).
60. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1014 (West 1965).
61. (a) A telephone report of a known or suspected instance of child abuse shall
include the name of the person making the report, the name of the child, the present
location of the child, the nature and extent of the injury, and any other information,
including information that led such person to suspect child abuse, requested by the child
protective agency. CAL. PENAL CODE § 11167 (West 1982).
[T]he therapist's obligation to his patient requires that he not disclose a confi-
dence unless such disclosure is necessary to avert danger to others, and even
then that he do so discreetly, and in a fashion that would presume the privacy of
his patient to the fullest extent compatible with the prevention of the threatened
danger. Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of California, 17 Cal. 3d 425, 441,
131 (al. Rptr. 14, 27 (1976).
I/
1984, Earl Sands, a Florida man accused of sexually abusing a six-
year old girl, surrendered to his pastor, John Mellish. Mellish ac-
companied Sands to the police station but refused to reveal what
Sands had told him. Although such claims of confidentiality are nor-
mally honored by judges, Mellish was sentenced to sixty days of con-
finement for contempt of court.6 2 The Florida trial court was willing
to ignore a long-standing clergy-penitent privilege in this criminal
proceeding involving child abuse. 3
In California, the psychotherapist-client privilege may protect a
psychotherapist in a situation similar to Mellish's from having to di-
vulge client confidences in a criminal proceeding. Even though the
privilege will shield a therapist from the duty to testify regarding
child abuse revealed in therapy, it is unlikely that the privilege will
free a therapist from the obligation to report such child abuse dis-
closed in therapy. The reporting statute specifies that psychothera-
pists must report when they know of or suspect abuse.e4 In addition
to this mandate, the existence of the dangerous patient exceptionl to
the psychotherapist-client privilege offers strong evidence that the
legislature did not intend to protect communication between thera-
pist and client if divulging the communication was necessary to pre-
vent harm to another, in this case, to a child.
LIABILITY FOR NOT REPORTING CHILD ABUSE
The California child abuse reporting statute requires psychothera-
pists to report when they know of or reasonably suspect child
abuse.66 As discussed earlier, it is unlikely that a therapist could suc-
cessfully challenge this mandate on constitutional grounds or by
claiming the psychotherapist-client privilege. California has granted,
by statute, immunity from civil and criminal action that might be
taken against a psychotherapist who reports in conformity with the
law.67 This immunity relieves a psychotherapist from the risk of civil
or criminal responsibility for defamation, invasion of privacy, or
62. An appellate review of the case is pending. TImE Oct. 1, 1984, at 66. In at
least 20 states, toughened child abuse laws have eliminated the clergy-penitent privilege
in this context. Id.
63. Id.
64. CAL. PENAL CODE § 11166 (West 1982).
65. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1024 (West 1966).
66. CAL. PENAL CODE § 11166 (West 1982).
67. No child care custodian, medical practitioner, nonmedical practitioner, or
employee of a child protective agency who reports a known or suspected in-
stance of child abuse shall be civilly or criminally liable for any report required
or authorized by this article. Any other person reporting a known or suspected
instance of child abuse shall not incur civil or criminal liability as a result of any
report authorized by this article unless it can be proven that a false report was
made and the person knew the report was false.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 11172 (West 1982).
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breach of confidence."8 Although a therapist is released from liability
for reporting child abuse, he or she risk both criminal and civil lia-
bility for not reporting child abuse as mandated.
Criminal Liability
In California, persons violating the reporting statute are guilty of
a misdemeanor6 punishable by imprisonment in the county jail for a
period not to exceed six months, or by imposition of a fine not to
exceed one thousand dollars, or both.7" Most authors believe that
statutory reporting requirements have little value unless the law pro-
vides a means of enforcement. 1 Although criminal prosecution for
failing to report child abuse is rare,7 2 these sanctions may still pro-
mote reporting by serving as a prod to the professional who has
scruples about acting as an "informer. '7 3
Civil Liability
Psychotherapists may be more vulnerable to civil suits than to
criminal prosecution, 4 especially if the abuse continues after the
psychotherapist knows or suspects it and fails to report. Non-report-
ing physicians have been subject to civil suits in at least two in-
stances. In 1970, in a case which eventually settled, five-month old
Thomas Robison was admitted to Sierra Vista Hospital in San Luis
Obispo where X-rays showed a skull fracture. The child was re-
turned to his seventeen-year old mother three days later. Twice
within the next month he required further hospital treatment for
whip welts, puncture wounds and burned fingertips. The last time
the child was admitted he had strangulation marks and had stopped
breathing. Permanent injury resulted. The mother's boyfriend was
convicted of child beating and was imprisoned. The child's natural
68. McCord, supra note 56, at 37-38.
69. CAL. PENAL CODE § 11162 (West 1982).
70. CAL. PENAL CODE § 19 (West 1984).
71. Sussman, Reporting Child Abuse: A Review of the Literature, 8 FAM. L.Q.
245, 295-96 (1974) McCord, supra note 56, at 43.
72. Kohlman, Malpractice liability for failing to report child abuse, 49 CAL. ST.
B.J. 118, 121.
73. "There is indeed, little reason for placing a criminal punishment in the law
except that its presence may strengthen the point that parents will find a physician's
actions in reporting more palatable if it is required by law." Paulson, The Law and the
Abused Child, in THE BATTERED CHILD 163 (Helfer and Kempe, 2d ed. 1972). See also
McCord, supra note 56, at 41-43.
74. Sussman, Reporting Child Abuse: A Review of the Literature, 8 FAM. L.Q.
245, 297 (1974).
father brought a $5,000,000 civil suit against four doctors at the hos-
pital for failing to report the attacks and against the police chief for
not investigating properly when another doctor did report the abuse.
The case was settled for $600,000 and a trust account for the child
was established.7 5
Subsequently, the California Supreme Court in 1976 recognized a
cause of action for failure to report child abuse in Landeros v.
Flood.7 6 In that case, the eleven-month old plaintiff was brought to
San Jose Hospital by her mother. The attending physician, defen-
dant Flood, released the child after treating several injuries which,
according to the allegation of the plaintiff, appeared to be intention-
ally inflicted. The child suffered permanent injury from beatings in-
flicted after her release. The plaintiff's guardian ad litem brought
the civil suit against Flood and the hospital." The court held that
the "battered child syndrome" was an accepted medical diagnosis, 7 8
and that the plaintiff was entitled to prove that a reasonable and
prudent physician would have followed the appropriate treatment
procedures, which included reporting to the authorities.79 The court
also held that the plaintiff was entitled to prove that the physician's
negligence was the proximate cause of the injury suffered on the the-
ory that the defendants should reasonably have foreseen that the
plaintiff's caretakers were likely to resume their physical abuse.80
The Landeros court also considered the plaintiff's allegations that
the defendants violated the child abuse reporting statute thereby
raising a presumption that the defendants failed to exercise due
care.81 The court ruled that if the plaintiff wished to invoke this pre-
sumption predicated on the fact that the defendant violated a stat-
ute, it would be necessary for her to persuade the trier of fact that
defendant Flood actually observed her injuries and formed the opin-
ion that they were intentionally inflicted on her. 2 It was also held
that this burden could be met through the introduction of circum-
stantial evidence and did not necessitate the acquisition of damaging
admissions from defendant Flood. 3
Landeros establishes that professionals who fail to report child
abuse may be vulnerable to civil action. The likelihood of such a civil
action is increased by the fact that a child, under California law, is
75. TIME Nov. 20, 1972, at 74.
76. 17 Cal. 3d 399, 131 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1976).
77. Id. at 405, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 70.
78. Id. at 409, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 73 (quoting People v. Jackson, 18 Cal. App 3d.
504, 516, 95 Cal. Rptr. 919 (1971)).
79. Id. at 410, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 74.
80. Id. at 412, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 76.
81. Id. at 413, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 76.
82. Id. at 415, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 77.
83. Id. at 415 n.13, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 78.
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provided with separate counsel in proceedings to terminate parental
custody because of abuse.8 4 One of the explicitly enumerated duties
of such counsel is to investigate the possibility of bringing a civil
action on behalf of the child against persons who violated the child
abuse reporting statute.8 5
Elements for a Negligence Cause of Action in Civil Courts
A child plaintiff wishing to bring a civil action for negligence
against a non-reporting psychotherapist must prove the usual four
elements of a negligence cause of action: a duty recognized by law;
breach of the duty; a reasonably close causal connection between the
breaching conduct and the resulting injury; and actual loss or dam-
age.86 A plaintiff in such a case will have the greatest difficulty prov-
ing the first element of negligence, a duty owed by the defendant to
the plaintiff.
In Landeros, proving that the defendant physician owed a duty to
the child plaintiff was relatively easy because the child was the phy-
sician's patient.87 On the other hand, attempting to prove that a psy-
chotherapist owes a duty to a child whom he or she is not treating
and perhaps does not even know, is considerably more challenging.
Historically, there is no legal duty to come to the aid of another
human being in danger. 8 In cases where a special relationship exists
between the parties, however, courts tend to depart from this histori-
cal stance.89 For example, duty has been found between employer-
employee, shopkeeper-visitor, host-guest, and in numerous other
relationships.90
84. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 318 (West 1984).
85. [C]ounsel shall investigate the interests of the child beyond the scope of
the juvenile proceeding and report to the court other interests of the child that
may be protected by other administrative or judicial proceedings, including but
not limited to a civil action pursuant to subdivision (6) of Section 11172 of the
Penal Code.
CAL WELF. & INST. CODE § 318 (West 1984).
Any person who fails to report an instance of child abuse which he or she knows
to exist or reasonably should know to exist, as required by this article, is guilty
of a misdemeanor and is punishable by confinement in the county jail for a term
not to exceed six months or by a fine. ...
CAL. PENAL CODE § 11172(b) (West 1982).
86. W. PROSSER, LAW OF ToRTs 143 (4th ed. 1971).
87. 17 Cal. 3d at 408-10, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 72-74.
88. W. PROSSER, supra note 86, at 240.
89. Id. at 341-42.
90. Id. at 342. See Anderson v. Atchison, T & SFR Co., 333 U.S. 821 (1948);
Connelly v. Kautman & Bact. Co. 349 Pa. 261 (1949); Hutchinson v. Nickie, 162 F.2d
103 (1947).
The duty arising from a special relationship is recognized in the
Restatement of Torts,91 and was applied by the California Supreme
Court in Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of California,92 a
case involving a psychiatrist. In Tarasoff, a psychiatrist was held lia-
ble to the parents of a woman murdered by his patient.9 3 The pa-
tient, Prosenji Poddar, confided his intentions to kill the woman to
his psychiatrist, Dr. Moore.94 At Dr. Moore's request, the campus
police detained Poddar, but then released him. After his release,
Poddar killed Tatiana Tarasoff.95 Her parents brought a wrongful
death action against the Regents of the University of California, the
psychotherapist, and the campus police.9"
The Tarasoff court applied an exception to the no-duty rule in
holding that the relationship between the defendant therapist and
either the victim or the assailant/client would suffice to support the
imposition of a duty,91 and that such a relationship may also support
a duty for the benefit of third parties. 8 The court explained that in
previous decisions, a duty was recognized when the defendant stood
in a special relationship to both the victim and the person whose
conduct created the danger. 9 The Tarasoff court, however, was will-
ing to impose a duty when only a single relationship existed between
the therapist and the client and there was no special relationship be-
tween the therapist and the victim. 00 The court held, "[O]nce a
therapist does in fact determine, or under applicable professional
standards, reasonably should have determined, that a patient poses a
serious danger of violence to others, he bears a duty to exercise rea-
sonable care to protect the foreseeable victim of that danger."'' ° The
court also noted that, when the identity of the victim is unknown but
might be revealed by a "moment's reflection," there may be a duty
to warn the foreseeable victim. 102
The Tarasoff holding is applicable to a child plaintiff attempting
to establish duty in a legal action against a psychotherapist for not
reporting ongoing abuse. The California Supreme Court, in
Tarasoff, was willing to extend the duty a therapist owes to a client
to persons the client may injure.103 Foreseeability was cited by the
91. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 315 (1965).
92. 17 Cal. 3d 425, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1976).
93. Id. at 450, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 33.
94. Id. at 430, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 19.
95. Id. at 429, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 19-20.
96. Id., 131 Cal. Rptr. at 20.
97. Id. at 435, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 23.
98. Id. at 436, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 23.
99. Id., 131 Cal. Rptr. at 24.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 439, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 25.
102. Id. n.l1.
103. Id. at 439, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 25-26.
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court as the most important consideration in establishing duty.10 4 If
a client confides to his or her therapist that he or she is abusing a
child, this child is a foreseeable victim under Tarasoff analysis. This
foreseeability may be augmented if the child lives with the client or
has an ongoing relationship with the client. Neither of these factors
was present in the Tarasoff case, yet the violence to the victim was
still considered to be foreseeable. The Tarasoff court's determination
that the therapist owes a duty to foreseeable victims is not an iso-
lated holding. This duty has been restated in the 1980 case of
Mavroudis v. Superior Court.15
The defendants in Tarasoff argued that violence is difficult to pre-
dict.' This contention was well supported in the amicus brief sub-
mitted by the American Psychiatric Association and other profes-
sional societies.'0 7 The court concluded, however, that the difficulty
encountered by the professional in accurately predicting violence
cannot negate that professional's duty to protect the threatened vic-
tim.108 Arguably, the violence involved in child abuse is more pre-
dictable than certain other types of violence because of the repetitive
nature of the crime.'0 9
In addition to foreseeability, the Tarasoff court held that consider-
ations of public policy enter into a decision regarding whether a par-
ticular plaintiff is entitled to protection." 0 There are strong policy
reasons for extending the duty a therapist owes to his or her client to
the children whom the client admits abusing. Children are often
physically, emotionally, and financially dependent on their abuser
and find it impossible to leave an abusive situation. Additionally,
children are usually physically weaker than their abuser and are un-
104. Id. at 434, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 22. See also Weirum v. R.K.O., 15 Cal. 3d 40
(1975) which establishes that while duty is a question of law, foreseeability is a question
of fact for the jury.
105. 102 Cal. App. 3d 594, 162 Cal. Rptr. 724 (1980). Therein plaintiff parent
sued a therapist and hospital after being attacked with a hammer by their son. Allegedly,
the son's therapist knew or should have known of the danger and warned the parents.
The court held that the defendants did not know of the danger, but had they known, a
cause of action would have existed. Id. at 594. The court re-stated the therapist's duty to
protect third parties. Id. at 601.
106. 17 Cal. 3d at 437, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 24.
107. Id. at 437, 131 Cal. Rtpr. at 24.
108. Id. at 439, 131 Cal. Rtpr. at 26.
109. McCord, supra note 56, at 18.
110. 17 Cal. 3d at 434, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 22. "[D]uty is not sacrosanct in itself,
but only a sum total of those considerations of policy which led the law to say that a
particular plaintiff is entitled to protection." (quoting W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 332-
33 (3d ed. 1964).
able to defend themselves. Moreover, children frequently have been
taught both to respect and obey the person who is abusing them, and
sometimes do not question or even reveal the abuse. In some cases,
the therapist may be the only person other than the abuser, who
knows what is happening to the child. 1 '
Once a child plaintiff proves this first element in an action for
negligence, the remaining three elements are somewhat easier to
prove. The second element is shown if the plaintiff proves that the
defendant breached the duty owed. If a psychotherapist knew the
plaintiff was being abused and did not report it, the duty has been
breached. It is somewhat more complex to prove that a therapist rea-
sonably suspected, or should have reasonably suspected, abuse and
failed to report it. Here the plaintiff must prove that a reasonable
psychotherapist in similar circumstances, with similar training and
information, would have suspected and reported abuse."'
To prove the third element, the plaintiff must show a reasonably
close connection between the breach of duty and the injury suffered.
In California, a simple phone call to a child protective agency acti-
vates an entire system mandated by statute."- The main purpose of
this system is to protect the reported child from injury. Proving that
a psychotherapist failed to use this well-established procedure to pro-
tect a foreseeable victim of abuse would most likely meet the re-
quirement for a causal connection between the breach of duty to re-
port and the subsequent injury to the child. The fourth element,
injury to the victim, can usually be established without difficulty.1 4
Violation of a Statute and Presumption of Negligence
Without separately proving all four elements of negligence, it may
still be possible to impose liability on a non-reporting psychotherapist
by proving he or she has violated a statute. When a statute is en-
acted by the legislature, the law can be interpreted as fixing a stan-
dard of care from which it is considered negligent per se to devi-
ate.1  A psychotherapist who knows or reasonably suspects child
abuse and does not report the abuse violates California Penal Code §
11166.118 Under specified conditions, failure to exercise due care is
presumed when a statute is violated, although the presumption may
111. See Note, Reporting Child Abuse: When Moral Obligations Fail, 15 PAc.
L.J. 189, 196-200 (1983).
112. CAL. PENAL CODE § II 166a (West 1982). Reasonable suspicion in the 1981
statute is an objective standard. Id.
113. CAL. PENAL CODE § 11166 (West 1982).
114. See Timnick & Rae-Dupree, New Scope Helps Confirm Sexual Abuse L.A.
Times, Jan. 17, 1985, at 3. See also NEWSWEEK Aug. 20, 1984, at 44.
115. W. PROSSER, supra note 86, at 190.
116. CAL. PENAL CODE § 11166 (West 1982).
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be rebutted. 17
The presumption of negligence was applied to the battered child
question in Landeros v. Flood."" Although the Landeros court found
a cause of action under common law negligence theory, it also held
that the plaintiff could rely on the reporting statute and was entitled
an opportunity to prove both the violation of the statute and the exis-
tence of the statutory conditions for invoking the presumption of lack
of due care. 119 Under Landeros, the plaintiff must prove that he or
she is a member of the class of persons whom the statute is intended
to protect, and that the harm suffered is of a type that the statute
was designed to prevent. 120 Additionally, the plaintiff must prove
that the defendant's violation of the statute proximately caused the
injury to the plaintiff. 2'
The existence of a child abuse reporting statute increases the like-
lihood that civil liability will be imposed for not reporting abuse as
mandated. In a legal action against a non-reporting therapist, the
statute gives the child plaintiff the option of proving the presumption
of negligence as an alternative to proving all four common law ele-
ments of negligence. Court-appointed counsel for an abused child, as
provided for in California Welfare and Institutions Code Section
117. Failure to exercise due care:
(a) the failure of a person to exercise due care is presumed if:
(1) he violated a statute, ordinance, or regulation of a public entity;
(2) the violation proximately caused death or injury to person or property;
(3) the death or injury resulted from an occurrence of the nature which the
statute, ordinance or regulation was designed to prevent; and
(4) the person suffering the death of the injury to his person or property was one
of the class of persons for whose protection the statute, ordinance, or regulation
was adopted.
(b) This presumption may be rebutted by proof that:
(1) the person violating the statute, ordinance or regulation did what might rea-
sonably be expected of a person of ordinary prudence, acting under similar cir-
cumstances who desired to comply with the law; or
(2) the person violating the statute, ordinance, or regulation was a child and
exercised the degree of care ordinarily exercised by persons of his maturity, in-
telligence, and capacity under similar circumstances, but the presumption may
not be rebutted by such proof if the violation occurred in the course of an activ-
ity normally engaged in only by adults and requiring adult qualification.
CAL EvID. CODE § 669 (West Supp. 1985).
118. 17 Cal. 3d 399, 414, 131 Cal. Rptr. 69, 77 (1976).
119. Id. See also Note, supra note 111, at 211-12.
120. 17 Cal. 3d at 413 n.l1, 131 Cal. Rptr. 76 n.11.
121. Id. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 669 (West 1966). See also Note, supra note 9, at
211-12.
318, may act on behalf of the child in bringing this type of action, as
was the case in Landeros.122
REASONS FOR NOT REPORTING CHILD ABUSE
Possible Effects on the Therapeutic Process
Faced with possible civil liability for not reporting, and the poten-
tial benefits to a child when reports are made, why would a therapist
choose not to report known or suspected abuse? 2 ' A primary reason
a psychotherapist might not report is his or her concern that report-
ing would have a detrimental effect on the therapeutic process. The
importance of confidentiality in therapy has been noted by several
experts. 124 Without the assurance of confidentiality some persons
needing help may not enter into therapy.'25 Others may be less open
in therapy, giving the therapist minimal information with which to
assist the patient. 26 In addition to restricting the degree of openness,
the absence of assured confidentiality may reduce the trust between
the patient and the therapist that is essential to successful
treatment.'27
122. See supra note 85.
123. Cf. Brown & Truitt, Civil Liability in Child Abuse Cases, 54 Cm-KENT L.
REv. 753, 761 (1978). The survey therein indicated that only 1.6% of the child abuse
reports filed in the U.S. came from private physicians. The authors give some reasons
why physicians are reluctant to report child abuse:
1. Misconstruction of doctor and patient relationship, not understanding
whether his responsibility is to child or his/her parent;
2. Fear of civil actions (e.g. libel, slander, breach of confidential relationship);
3. Desire to avoid involvement in criminal or civil prosecution of the parent (tes-
tifying at trial, etc.);
4. Refusal to believe or recognize a case involves child abuse, therefore, failure
to diagnose battered child syndrome;
5. Feeling threatened by the requirement that they report suspected abuse or
neglect, particularly if their livelihood depends upon a positive image in their
community and referrals from other neighboring health professionals; and
6. Fear of testifying in court, part of which is justified because of their lack of
training to assume this role.
Id. at 761. (quoting Helfer, Why Most Physicians Don't Get Involved in Child Abuse
Cases and What to Do About It, 4 CHILDREN TODAY 30 (1975)). See also McCord,
supra note 56, at 36-43.
124. See Smith, supra note 20, at 24-47. See also Merton, Confidentiality and the
"Dangerous" Patient: Implications of Tarasoff For Psychiatrists and Lawyers, 31 EMi-
ORY L.J. 263, 306-8 (1982); Note, Where the Peril Begins: A Survey of Psychotherapists
to determine the effects of Tarasoff, 31 STAN. L. REV., 165, 168, 184 (1978).
125. Cf. People v. Bullard, 75 Cal. App. 3d 764, 142 Cal. Rptr. 473 (1977). (par-
ent did not seek medical attention for battered child for fear of prosecution).
126. Smith, supra note 20, at 24-25.
127. Smith, supra note 20, at 26.
[E]ven if the patient fully discloses his thoughts, assurances that the confidential
relationship will not be breached is necessary to maintain his trust in his psychi-
atrist - the very means by which treatment is affected. [T]he essence of much
psychotherapy is the contribution of trust in the internal world and ultimately in
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These views regarding the importance of confidentiality were reit-
erated by Justice Clark, dissenting in Tarasoff. "Many people, po-
tentially violent - yet susceptible to treatment - will be deterred
from seeking it; those needing it, will be inhibited from making reve-
lations necessary to effective treatment; and, forcing the psychiatrist
to violate the patient's trust will destroy the interpersonal relation-
ship by which treatment is affected."' 12 8 This belief lies behind the
enactment of the psychotherapist-client privilege in California. 12 9
There is some empirical evidence that supports the importance of
confidentiality in therapy. A Stanford study' 30 conducted to deter-
mine the effects of Tarasoff found that one-fourth of the responding
therapists observed that their patients were reluctant to discuss vio-
lent tendencies when the patient learned that the therapist might, in
some circumstances, breach confidentiality. 13' Sherman and Wei-
ner,13 2 in a study of the effect of the psychotherapist-client privilege,
asked a group of lay persons not in therapy what they would disclose
to a therapist without a privilege in force. The study showed that
those interviewed would most likely withhold information that had
legal consequences - physical violence, speeding violations, income
tax evasion, and theft. 33
However, Sherman and Weiner also interviewed individuals who
were in therapy. They found that the most prominent reason for a
patient's withholding information in therapy was the fear of the
therapist's personal judgments about their thoughts and behavior,
rather than a concern that their actions were legally punishable if
the therapist breached their confidence.' Forty percent of the inter-
viewees receiving psychotherapy admitted withholding information
from the therapists. 35 Seventy percent of this information had to do
with sexual acts and thoughts, nine percent of the withheld informa-
the self, modeled upon the trusting relationship established during therapy.
17 Cal. 3d at 459-60 (Clark J. dissenting) (quoting Davidoff, The Malpractice of Psy-
chiatrists, DUKE L.J. 696, 704 (1966)).
128. 17 Cal. 3d at 460, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 40. (Clark, J. dissenting).
129. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1014 (West 1966) Senate Committee on Judiciary
Comment.
130. Note, supra note 124. This study involved 179 Psychologists and 1,093 psy-
chiatrists who responded to a mail questionnaire.
131. Id. at 177, 183.
132. Sherman & Weiner, The Privilege Study: An Empirical Examination of the
Psychotherapist - Patient Privilege, 60 N.C.L. REV. 893 (1982).
133. Id. at 920. Ninety-three percent of this group indicated that they would seek
help from a psychiatrist or a psychologist for a serious emotional problem. Id.
134. Id. at 920, 926.
135. Id. at 925.
tion concerned thoughts of violence, and an additional nine percent
concerned financial issues.13 This study suggests that confidentiality
is not the most significant factor considered by a client before re-
vealing sensitive information.137
The foregoing inquiry into the importance of confidentiality
prompts the question whether therapists discuss, or should discuss,
limits of confidentiality with their clients. Of the psychotherapists in
the Stanford study, eleven percent indicated that they always dis-
cussed confidentiality; the majority stated that they did so "some-
times. 13 8 Sherman and Weiner report that fourteen percent of the
therapists surveyed routinely raised the question of confidentiality
with their patients.'39 Some authors have proposed that therapists, at
the commencement of therapy, couple the assurance of confidential-
ity with a "quasi-Miranda"'40  warning as to the limits of
confidentiality.' 41
Although confidentiality may be important, it is not the only fac-
tor affecting openness and progress in therapy. When a client is
abusing children, it may be more advantageous to the therapeutic
process to set aside confidentiality and report the abuse to the au-
thorities. Some experts in the field of abuse believe that a single
therapist cannot handle the complexities and multiple needs of an
abusive family and that it is to the advantage of both the client and
the therapist to seek the participation of protective agencies. 42 Pro-
ponents of a team approach argue that each family member needs
evaluation and counseling while the child needs protection. When a
therapist operates alone and solely upon information received from
the abusing client, it is difficult to measure accurately the extent of
the problem and the progress made in therapy. Investigators have
found that several professionals working together, sharing a common
interest in the family, are less likely to be misled into a superficial
resolution than is a single therapist working alone.143 Also, profes-
sionals working together draw guidance and support from one
136. Id. at 926.
137. Id.
138. Note, supra note 130, at 176.
139. Sherman & Weiner, supra note 132, at 921. This information is based on 84
therapists responding to a questionnaire. When asked by patients if communications were
held in strict confidence, forty-seven percent of the therapists in the Sherman and Weiner
study told their clients that confidentiality would be maintained unless the patient was
dangerous to himself. Twenty-two percent said that confidentiality would be maintained
unless a court ordered disclosure, and twelve percent said that confidentiality was abso-
lute. Id.
140. Merton, supra note 124, at 306.
141. A discussion of the responsibility a therapist has to his or her client to explain
confidentiality and its limits is beyond the scope of this Comment.
142. Summit, supra note 42.
143. Id.
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another and assist in building interagency bridges."' The client, too,
receives support from the involvement of additional professionals and
from the opportunity to interact with parent groupsY.4 5
Legal Action Against the Client
A second reason a therapist may hesitate to report child abuse is
the possibility of negative repercussions on the client. Although the
California reporting statute does not require the reporter to give the
identity of the abuser, the enacting legislature intended that a thor-
ough assessment be made of each incident of abuse reports, includ-
ing a "determination of the person or persons apparently responsible'
for the abuse."' 46 The therapist may wonder whether his or her cli-
ent will be prosecuted or lose custody of the child.
Nationally, reports indicate that only five percent of the substanti-
ated cases of child abuse result in criminal prosecution of the abuser,
and less than twenty percent of substantiated cases result in the
child being removed from the home.' 47 Sexual abuse is more fre-
quently the subject of criminal prosecution than any other type of
child abuse or neglect.' 48 In California, the child protective agency
forwards a preliminary written report of disclosed abuse 49 to the
Justice Department. 5 This information is, in turn, made available
to the district attorney.' 5' The filing of a dependency petition'52 on
behalf of abused children is left to the discretion of the Juvenile Pro-
bation Department. The filing of criminal complaints, most likely to
occur against molesters, is entirely within the discretion of the dis-
trict attorney.'53
144. Id.
145. Id. at 26.
146. CAL. PENAL CODE § 11165 (West 1982) (Historical Notes),
147. Besharov, supra note 3, at 159-60.
148. Bulkley, The Law and Child Abuse, in DEALING WITH SEXUAL CHILD ABUSE
3 (1982).
149. CAL. PENAL CODE, § 11169 (West 1982). All cases except "general neglect"
are forwarded to the Justice Department. "General neglect" means the negligent failure
of a person having the care or custody of a child to provide adequate food, clothing,
shelter, or supervision where no physical injury to the child has occurred." CAL. PENAL
CODE § 11165 (West 1982).
150. CAL. PENAL CODE § 11169 (West 1982).
151. CAL. PENAL CODE § 11170 (West 1982).
152. A minor can be adjudged a dependent of the court and taken from the physi-
cal custody of his parents or guardians if, upon a hearing, the juvenile court finds clear
and convincing evidence that the child's physical or emotional health is in danger. CAL.
WELF. & INST. CODE § 361 (West 1984).
153. National Legal Resource Center of Child Advocacy and Protection INNOVA-
TIONS IN THE PROSECUTION OF CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE CASES 26 (November 1982) [here-
Realizing that a client may be prosecuted for sexual assault, 5"
some therapists undoubtedly feel they are acting as "informers"le if
they report, and are legitimately concerned that in response to the
report, their client will be treated as the "sludge of the earth"' 6 by
the justice system and by the community. At one time the prevailing
course of action regarding intrafamily child sexual abuse was to re-
move the child from the home, incarcerate the offender and consider
the problem "solved. 1 57 Fortunately, this is no longer the trend in
California. In 1976, the State of California Child Sexual Abuse
Training and Demonstration Center was established in Santa Clara
County to train professionals and to establish similar programs
throughout the state.158
To use the Santa Clara County program as an example, approxi-
mately ninety-five percent of all intrafamily child sex offense cases
arising in the county are referred to the program. 159 The program
includes individual counseling, family counseling, group counseling,
and follow-up service. The self-help components of Parents United,
and Daughters and Sons United, lend support.'60 Over eighty per-
cent of the referred offenders successfully complete the program."1
The Santa Clara program determined that for treatment in the
program to be effective, participation must be mandated by both
criminal and juvenile courts.162 When fathers were the abusers, they
found that without a juvenile court mandate, mothers of victims re-
peatedly failed to involve themselves and their children in the ther-
apy/self-help process. 163 In addition, program therapists believe that
the changes the parent must make are often too painful and fright-
ening to be undergone voluntarily.164 In fact, treatment program pro-
fessionals who handle all types of sex offenders share the belief that
inafter cited as National Legal Resource Center].
154. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 11165(b) (West 1982). "Sexual assault" means con-
duct and violation of the following sections of the Penal Code: § 261 (rape); § 264.1
(rape in consert); § 285 (incest); § 286 (sodomy); § 288(a),(b) (lewd or lascivious acts
upon a child under age 14 years); § 288(a) (oral copulation); § 289 (penetration of a
genital or anal opening by a foreign object), § 697(a) (child molestation).
155. McCord, supra note 56, at 43.
156. National Legal Resource Center, supra note 153, at 24.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 25. See CAL, WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 18275-18281 (West 1980).
159. National Legal Resource Center, supra note 153, at 32.
160. Id. at 30.
161. Id. at 32. When the court terminates probation because the offender has suc-
cessfully completed the program as a stated condition, it will also change his plea from
guilty (or in a few cases, no contest) to not guilty and dismiss the case pursuant to CAL.
PEN. CODE § 1213.4 (West Supp. 1980). This entitles the offender to state he has never
been convicted of a felony or misdemeanor. Additionally, he is no longer required to be
registered as a sex offender. Id.
162. National Legal Resource Center, supra note 153, at 32.
163. Id. at 29.
164. Id. at 28.
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the offender will be unmotivated in therapy unless some undesirable
consequence, such as a prison term, is imposed for failure to partici-
pate. 6 5 Additionally, some authors believe that the involvement of
the justice system satisfies an "expiatory factor" necessary in treat-
ment.16 The common belief among experts that the criminal justice
system plays an important, positive role in the treatment of the sex
offender may counteract some of the hesitancy a therapist may expe-
rience in reporting child abuse to the authorities.
Confusion Regarding Compliance
Even after reading the statute a psychotherapist may have many
questions regarding compliance and may fail to report child abuse as
a result of these uncertainties. Therapists may not report abuse be-
cause they are unsure about how certain they must be that abuse is
occurring before they are required to report it. 167 The term "reason-
ably suspect"' 68 implies both an objective and subjective standard.
"Reasonably," in the legal sense, means what a reasonable person in
similar circumstances would suspect in a particular case.'6 9 The term
"suspect" has more subjective connotations and suggests a standard
under which the reporter alone must hold the requisite belief.170 For-
tunately, the California statute explicitly states that "reasonably sus-
pect" is an objective standard which asks whether a reasonable pro-
fessional in similar circumstances would suspect and report child
abuse. 17
When the client is not abusing his or her own children, the iden-
tity of the victim may be in question. Therapists may wonder if they
are under any obligation to learn the child's name. If serious abuse is
ongoing, a therapist could conceivably be required to inquire into the
identity of the child. A therapist might also be required to report
abused children whose identity could be ascertained through
165. Wenck, Sexual Child Abuse: An American Shame that Can Be Changed, 12
CAP. U. L. REv. 355, 364 (1983).
166. Henry Siarreto, the psychologist who founded the Santa Clara County Pro-
gram, concludes: "In all cases the authority of the criminal justice systems and the court
process, seems necessary in order to satisfy what might be termed an expiatory factor in
the treatment of the offender and his family." E. BREACHER, TREATMENT PROGRAMS FOR
SEX OFFENDERS 30 (1978).
167. Sussman, supra note 74, at 276.
168. CAL. PENAL CODE § 11166 (West 1982).
169. Sussman, supra note 74, at 277.
170. Id.
171. CAL. PENAL CODE, § 11166(a) (West 1982). See also Sussman, supra note
74, at 277.
a "moment's reflection," a standard mentioned by the Tarasoff
court.172
Yet another concern is whether a therapist must report past abuse
that is no longer being inflicted. If the statute is read literally, past
abuse must be reported.173 The decision whether or not to investigate
is left to child protective services. This agency makes a determina-
tion whether to investigate based on such factors as how long ago the
abuse occurred, the type of abuse, whether the abuser still has con-
tact with the child, and whether the child is still a minor.
CONCLUSION
In the last 25 years there has been a significant increase in the
amount of legislation aimed at protecting children. The legislature
has imposed criminal sanctions on those who inflict serious harm on
children, has allowed juvenile courts to institute protective supervi-
sion or order that a child be removed from his or her home, and has
authorized the creation of child protective services. Society can inter-
vene and offer remedies, however, only when it knows about the
abuse. The reporting statutes are a key component to stopping child
abuse. For this reason it is reasonable to impose criminal or civil
liability on individuals who breach their legal duty to report child
abuse.
The recent trend to bring legal action against persons who have a
duty to protect children and fail to do so has its drawbacks. Dedi-
cated and caring professionals who are attempting to deal with diffi-
cult social problems may be the most vulnerable to these types of
lawsuits. Psychotherapists are among the groups of professionals who
run the risk of civil liability when they fail to report abuse, and the
risk remains even when they learn of the abuse from their clients in
the confidential setting of therapy. Although it may be difficult for a
therapist to report child abuse discovered in this context, the advan-
tages of requiring therapists to do so outweigh the unpleasant com-
plications that may arise when a therapist complies with the report-
ing statute.
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